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In firms with concentrated ownership the controlling shareholder may pursue
nonmonetary private returns, such as electoral goals in a firm controlled by politi-
cians or family prestige in family firms. We use a simple theoretical model to ana-
lyze how this mechanism affects the selection of executives and, through this, the
firm’s productivity compared to a benchmark where the owner only cares about
the value of the firm. We discuss identification and derive two structural estimates
of the model, based on different sample moments. The estimates, based on a
matched employer–employee data set of Italian firms, suggest that private returns
are larger in family- and government-controlled firms than in firms controlled by
a conglomerate or by a foreign entity. The resulting distortion in executive selec-
tion can account for total factor productivity differentials between control types
of up to 10%.
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1. Introduction
This paper studies executive selection in firms with concentrated ownership, a con-
trol structure that the recent corporate finance literature has shown to be very diffused
around the world (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Faccio and Lang
(2002)). Unlike public corporations, where the separation between ownership and con-
trol naturally puts agency issues at center stage, our hypothesis is that in firms with con-
centrated ownership, the controlling shareholder may pursue nonmonetary private re-
turns such as electoral goals in a firm controlled by politicians or family prestige in a firm
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controlled by an individual.1 We focus on a specific form of owners’ private benefits: we
assume that owners may derive utility not only from profits, but also from employing
executives with whom they have developed personal ties. Personal ties and repeated
interaction can facilitate the delivery of nonmonetary payoffs that are typically not ver-
ifiable in court and therefore cannot be part of the employment contract. For example,
the owner of a family business might enjoy a compliant entourage and/or a group of ex-
ecutives who pursue family prestige, possibly at the expense of the value of the firm.2 If
owners value personal ties, they might do so at the expenses of managerial ability, thus
distorting the process of executive selection with respect to a situation where the owner
only aims to maximize the value of the firm. We formalize this mechanism and propose
two distinct sets of structural estimates to quantify its effects on firms’ productivity.
We consider a simple partial-equilibrium, infinite horizon economy in which the
firm owner chooses the firm’s executives. We assume that average managerial ability de-
termines the firm total factor productivity (TFP).3 Executives are heterogeneous along
two dimensions: their ability (productivity) and their relationship value. The owner only
learns these values after an in-office trial period for the executive. Upon learning ability
and relationship value, the owner decides whether to give tenure to the executive, who
in this case turns “senior,” or to replace him with a “junior” one. We assume that rela-
tionship building takes time, so that only senior executives may deliver private returns
from the personal relationship. The key decision for the firm owner is whether to retain
the executive in the firm after the trial period or to replace her with a junior one. Once
tenured, executives in office die with an exogenous probability.
The model is formulated as an optimal sequential search problem in the spirit of
McCall (1970) and Weitzman (1979). We solve it analytically and derive three key predic-
tions that form the basis for our empirical investigation. First, the firm’s productivity de-
clines monotonically with the importance assigned to private benefits. This is because
the owner’s tenure decisions are based less on ability and more on personal ties as the
importance of private benefits increases. Second, the owners who attach more impor-
tance to relationships will, on average, retain a larger share of senior executives, as some
low-ability executives with whom they have developed a personal relationship will not
be fired. Finally, we show that the cross-firm correlation between productivity and the
share of senior executives measures the strength of the selection effect on managerial
ability, defined as the difference in the average ability of senior and junior executives.
1Consistent with the hypothesis that control commands a premium, Dyck and Zingales (2004) provided
cross-country evidence that controlling blocks are sold on average at a 14% premium, up to 65% in cer-
tain countries; see below for more details. The importance of private benefits of control is also stressed
by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), who showed that in the United States, average returns of pri-
vately held firms are dominated by the market portfolio. They concluded that owners of private firms must
be obtaining some form of nonmonetary return.
2Becker was the first to stress the importance of nonpure consumption components of preferences for
individual decision making, for example, in his classic analysis of discrimination (Becker (1971)). In the
introduction to the book that collects his contributions on this topic, he stated that “Men and women want
respect, recognition, prestige, acceptance, and power from their family, friends, peers, and others” (Becker
(1998, p. 12)).
3This is akin to Lucas (1978), where TFP depends on entrepreneurial ability.
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Intuitively, if selection is based on talent only, then a large fraction of senior executives
signals that the firm found a talented pool of executives and is, therefore, highly pro-
ductive. Instead, when the owner cares mostly about personal ties, a large share of se-
nior executives is not very informative about the firm’s productivity, because their ability
played little role in the selection process. We prove that this correlation can be estimated
by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of TFP on the share of senior executives.
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms for which
we have detailed information on the firms’ characteristics, including the complete work
history of their executives. We construct TFP using the Olley and Pakes (1996) proce-
dure, and define senior executives as those who have been with the firm for at least 5
years. The data classify the controlling shareholder into four broad control types: in-
dividual/family, the government, a conglomerate, or a foreign/institutional owner. We
estimate the model by allowing the importance of private returns to vary across control
types (conditional on additional covariates, such as time and sectoral effects).
Our first exercise is based on measuring the selection effect via an OLS regression of
TFP on the share of senior executives. We find that selection is weaker in government
and family firms, and that private benefits generate substantial losses in productivity.
Note that these estimates are not based on differences in average productivity and se-
niority across types, as we include ownership dummies. Still, omitted variables and un-
observed heterogeneity might give rise to the correlation we observe within type. For
example, one might conjecture that older firms might both be more productive and em-
ploy more senior executives. We address this important criticism in two ways. First we
argue, and show formally, that the omitted variable bias might explain the correlation
within type, but not the differences across types. It is precisely the variation of the es-
timated coefficients across types that is predicted by our model and confirmed by the
data. Second, we perform a large series of robustness checks, such as adding more con-
trols and using profitability—rather than productivity—as a performance indicator.
We then move on to a structural estimation of all the model parameters. We show
that there is a one-to-one mapping between the average productivity and seniority mea-
sured in the data, and the model parameters that capture the importance of private ben-
efits. We find that the executive selection is distorted with respect to the benchmark of
no private benefits in all control types. The distortion is smallest for conglomerate and
foreign-controlled firms. Private benefits account for a decrease in average firm produc-
tivity of around 6% in family firms and of 10% in government firms, as compared to
conglomerate- and foreign-controlled firms. Compared to the theoretical benchmark of
no private benefits, productivity losses are on the order of 7% for conglomerates, 8% for
foreign firms, 13% for family firms, and 17% for government firms.
We finally compare the OLS and the structural estimates. This comparison is in-
formative because the two sets of estimates use different sources of data variability to
identify the parameters: within-type correlation in productivity and seniority for the
OLS, and variation in average sample moments across control types for the structural
estimates. Nothing in the estimation procedure imposes that the two sets of estimates
should be consistent. The fact that they do produce quantitatively similar results offers
further support for the mechanism we propose.
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Two important caveats should be kept in mind. First, our empirical analysis is based
on a set of joint predictions: on the degree of correlation between TFP and seniority
within an ownership type, as well as on the correlation of average TFP and average
seniority across ownership types. These patterns are explained in terms of differences
in the degree of private benefits. Of course, firms with different ownership types differ
along other aspects. Arguably, one can think of alternative mechanisms that can explain
each specific pattern we find in the data. However, the advantage of a formal model
is that it supplies an explicit and coherent framework that accounts for all these facts
simultaneously and allows us to assess their consistency, as well as their impact on pro-
ductivity via counterfactuals, in a quantitative way. Second, we cannot draw normative
implications from our analysis, as private benefits do enter the owners’ utility function.
We only stress that they come at a cost in terms of productivity.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the connection with
the literature, in particular with Albuquerque and Schroth (2010), Bandiera, Guiso, Prat,
and Sadun (forthcoming), and Taylor (2010), who studied related problems. Section 3
develops a model to study how the presence of private returns affects the selection
of executives and average productivity within a firm. Section 4 describes the matched
employer–employee data and the classification of the various types of corporate con-
trol. In Section 5, we study the mapping between the model and the data, discussing the
identification of the structural model parameters. Section 6 presents a test of the model
hypotheses that exploits a model-based regression analysis. A subsection discusses sev-
eral robustness checks and alternative hypotheses. Section 7 presents structural esti-
mates of the model parameters, which are used to quantify the “costs” of private benefits
in terms of foregone productivity by means of simple counterfactual analysis. Section 8
concludes.
2. Related literature
The idea that private benefits play a central role in shaping firms’ performance is cen-
tral to the recent corporate governance literature La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (2000). Dyck and Zingales (2004) empirically estimated the value of private
benefits of control using the difference between the price per share of a transaction that
involved a controlling block and the price on the stock market before that transaction.
They found large values of private benefits of control. In particular, at 37%, the value
of private benefits in Italy is the second highest in a sample of 39 countries. Compared
to this literature, we focus on a very specific channel through which the private bene-
fits arise: the relationship between the owner and her executives. Moreover, we use the
model’s predictions on productivity and executive seniority distribution to estimate the
value of such a relationship, rather than referring to stock market data.
In our model, the inefficient selection occurs because the firm owner assigns value
to the personal relationship with the executives. The fact that personal ties between
firms’ high-ranked stakeholders (large shareholders, board members, top managers) is
detrimental for firm performance finds support in recent literature. Bandiera, Barankay,
and Rasul (2009) studied the effects of social connections among managers and work-
ers on performance. Using a field experiment, they showed that managers favor workers
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who they are socially connected to, possibly at the expense of the firm’s performance.
Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) studied the effects of social networks on the composi-
tion of firms’ boards of directors and performance in France. They found that networks,
defined in terms of school of graduation, influence the board composition; moreover,
firms with a higher share of directors from the same network have a worse performance.
Battistin, Graziano, and Parigi (2012) studied the effects of connections of top executives
in Italian banks on bank performance and turnover. Consistent with our results, they
concluded that connections reduce turnover and worsen performance, particularly in
local banks.
Our work also relates to the vast body of literature that documents that firms of
very different productivity levels coexist even within narrowly defined markets (see, e.g.,
Bartelsmann and Doms (2000), Syverson (2011)). As in Lucas (1978), in our model, dis-
persion in firm productivity derives from the underlying dispersion in managerial abil-
ity, subject to a cutoff level dictated by the selection effect.4 Differently from Lucas, in
our model, owners are willing to accept a low return on their investment because they
derive other types of returns, which weakens the selection effect and increases the cross
sectional dispersion in firms productivity. Empirically, we find this to be more relevant
for family firms, in line with a growing literature on empirical work practices and per-
formance in family firms (see, for example, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002),
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), Bandiera et al. (forthcoming), Michelacci and Schivardi
(2013)).
In terms of managerial turnover, Volpin (2002) studied top executive turnover in Ital-
ian listed firms. Consistent with our findings, family-controlled firms tend to have lower
turnover rates than foreign-controlled firms.5 Executive compensation, promotion poli-
cies, and turnover are subject to a growing and heterogeneous body of model-based
empirical analysis, using, among others, assignment (Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö
(2008)) or moral hazard models (Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2009)). Compared to this liter-
ature, we do not explicitly formalize the market for executives, but focus on the owner’s
decision to confirm or replace incumbent executives.
Three recent papers are closely related to ours. Albuquerque and Schroth (2010)
used a structural model to estimate the private benefits of control in negotiated block
transactions. They found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that those benefits
are large. Taylor (2010) built and estimated a structural model of chief executive officer
(CEO) turnover with learning about managerial ability and costly turnover. He found
that only very high turnover costs can rationalize the low turnover rate observed in the
data.6 He interpreted this result in terms of CEO entrenchment and weak governance.7
4Heterogeneity in an underlying unobservable firm characteristic has become the standard way to model
productivity dispersion at the firm level both in industrial organization (IO) (Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn
(1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995)) and in trade (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003)).
5He also found that the sensitivity of turnover to performance, an indicator of the quality of the gover-
nance, is not significantly different in the two groups. However, his sample has a small number of foreign-
controlled firms and, in fact, his main analysis is focussed on family-controlled firms only.
6See also Taylor (2013) for a model of learning about CEOs’ ability and wage dynamics.
7Garrett and Pavan (2012) studied managerial turnover when the quality of the match between a firm and
its top managers changes stochastically over time and is privately observed by the managers. They showed
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Compared to his paper we propose a different, possibly complementary, reason for in-
efficient turnover: owners trade off efficiency for the private benefits of the personal
relationships with their executives. We also use data on all top executives, rather than
CEOs alone, and exploit different ownership structures to estimate our model parame-
ters. Bandiera et al. (forthcoming) analyzed the role of incentive schemes in family and
nonfamily firms, assuming that family firms pursue private benefits of control. They
showed that family firms rely less on performance-based compensation schemes and
attract more risk-averse and less able managers. The model predictions are supported
by reduced-form regressions. We see their paper and ours as complementary. In fact,
Bandiera et al. (forthcoming) focussed on the optimal compensation scheme, an issue
that is ignored in our model. On the other hand, we introduce learning about managerial
ability in a dynamic setting, so that we can study turnover and seniority composition.
Moreover, we provide direct structural estimates of the importance of private benefits
by control type, supplying supporting evidence for a central assumption of their model.
3. A model of executive tenure and firm productivity
We model the decision problem of a firm owner in charge of selecting the executives
who run the firm. Our aim is to use the model to organize the empirical analysis. Given
that we will structurally estimate the model parameters, we keep it as simple as possible.
In particular, we focus on the owner’s selection problem and completely put aside the
market for executives.8 A firm employs n executives, depending on its size (not modeled
here). Each executive is characterized by an ability level xi. We assume that ability is a
shifter of the production function, x¯F(KL), where x¯ = 1n
∑
i xi is the average manage-
rial ability, K is the capital stock, and L is labor. This assumption has two consequences.
First, it implies that we will be able to measure average managerial ability by firm-level
TFP, which we use in the empirical section. Second, the fact that overall TFP is additive
in individual ability implies that we can study the problem of the owner for each single
executive in isolation from the others, as we exclude spillovers in ability among them.
This greatly simplifies the analysis in the model that we present next. We also assume
that, conditional on x¯, K and L are chosen optimally so that the profit function can be
written only as a function of x¯, and capital and labor can be ignored in what follows
without loss of generality.
3.1 The model
The problem describes executive selection by the firm owner. The executives are hired at
the junior level and become senior—and eligible for tenure—after one period. We think
of this period as the time during which executive’s quality is learned by the owner. An
that the optimal retention decision becomes more permissive over time, offering an alternative explanation
for what would look like CEO entrenchment.
8Our conjecture, to be verified in future work, is that the effects we identify would also hold both in a
competitive market for executives and in a search framework. In fact, as long as the private benefits create
a surplus, they should affect executive selection in the same way as in our framework, independently from
the surplus splitting rule.
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executive’s quality is characterized by two independent exogenous variables: his pro-
ductivity x, a nonnegative random variable with continuous and differentiable cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) G(x) with G(0)= 0 and expected value μ= ∫∞0 xdG(x),
and his relationship value r, a nonnegative random variable that is identically zero for
a junior executive and equals zero with probability 1− q or equals R with probability q
for a senior executive. The personal relationship is valuable because it facilitates the de-
livery of nonmonetary payoffs, which cannot be explicitly included in an employment
contract. For example, a politician might value executives who serve his political inter-
ests in government-controlled firms by hiring workers in his constituency. The owner of
a family business might enjoy a compliant entourage and/or a group of executives who
pursue the prestige of the family. The rationale for the value of relationships to mature
only for senior executives is that relationships take time to develop.9
We assume that on hiring a (junior) executive, the owner observes neither x nor r,
but only knows their distribution. At the end of the first period, the owner learns
the value of the executive’s productivity—a realization of x—and the value of his
relationship—the realization of r (either 0 or R > 0). It is assumed that both the exec-
utive relationship value and the productivity are specific to an executive–firm match,
so that if an executive moves to a new firm, both his x and r are unknown to the new
owner. After learning the realization of x and r, the owner decides whether to keep the
executive in office (i.e., give him tenure) or to replace him with a junior one (i.e., fire the
incumbent executive). It is convenient to define a new random variable s ≡ x+ r. Using
that x and r are independent, the CDF is
F(s)= qG(max(s−R0))+ (1− q)G(s) ∀s > 0 (1)
so that the probability that a senior executive with r + x≥ s is observed is 1− F(s).
If appointed, the (senior) executive stays one period with the firm and then dies with
an exogenous constant hazard ρ, so that the expected office tenure of a senior executive
is 1/ρ. When a senior executive dies, the owner replaces her with a junior one.
The per-period return for the risk-neutral owner is given by the realizations of
st = xt + rt ; his utility is given by the expected present value of the sum of these real-
izations, v ≡∑∞t=0βtst , where β is a time discount. The owner cares about the executive
productivity and his/her relationship value, and decides whether or not to fire an exec-
utive after observing the realization of both variables at the end of the first period. When
a junior executive is in office at the beginning of period t, there is no further decision to
be taken for the owner, and the expected value for the owner is
vy = μ+βEs˜max
{
vy vo(s˜)
}

9Of course, personal relationships might develop before the match forms, for example, if an owner hires
friends or relatives. In this case, exactly the same logic would apply to “connected” (friends or relatives)
versus “unconnected” executives. Unfortunately, in the data, we have no way to detect this type of relation-
ships, while we observe seniority. The two channels of personal ties are not mutually exclusive and might
both be at play.
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where expectations are taken with respect to the next-period realization of the executive
value s˜ and vo(s˜) denotes the value of a senior executive with known value s˜. This value
is
vo(s˜)=max
{
vy s˜+β
[
ρvy + (1− ρ)vo(s˜)
]}
 (2)
where the value function vo(s˜) is continuous and increasing in s˜.
The optimal policy follows a threshold rule: the owner fires the senior executive if
s < s∗, that is, if the value of s = r + x, learned when the executive becomes senior, is
below the threshold s∗.10 To be clear about the condition that pins down the optimal
threshold value s∗, it is useful to introduce two more pieces of notation. Let vys¯ denote
the conditional value of a junior executive under a generic policy threshold s¯. Likewise,
let us define vos¯(s˜) as the conditional value of a senior executive of type s˜ ≥ s¯ under a
generic policy threshold s¯. Obviously s¯ enters both (conditional) value functions because
it determines the senior executives who will be fired, that is, all those for whom s < s¯. We
can now state the condition that defines the optimal value of the threshold s∗ as the
smallest value of s that leaves the firm indifferent between keeping the senior executive
or appointing a junior one, namely
vos∗
(
s∗
)= vys∗  (3)
Appendix A shows how equation (3) can be used to obtain an analytical characterization
of s∗ that is useful for the comparative statics analysis below. This characterization leads
us to state our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Given the primitives β, ρ, G(·), and q, there exists a unique optimal
threshold s∗(R). Moreover,
(i) s∗(0) > μ,
(ii) s∗(R) satisfies
0<
∂s∗(R)
∂R
= qβ 1−G(s
∗ −R)
1+β(1− F(s∗)) < qβ< 1
See Appendix B for the proofs of all propositions.
The proposition states that when R ≡ 0 (relationships bring no value to the owner),
the optimal threshold s∗(0) > μ. Hence the senior executive retains office only if he is
sufficiently above the expected value of a junior μ. This is because the appointment of a
junior, and the possibility of future replacement, gives the policy of appointing a junior
a positive option value. The fact that productivity x is learned after one period induces
a selection whereby senior executives who retain office are more productive than the
average junior executive. This is shown in Figure 1, where the optimal threshold for the
R= 0 case lies to the right of μ (the mean of the ability distribution).
10As in the McCall (1970) model, the proof relies on the fact that the functions vo(s˜) and vy cross only
once.
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Figure 1. Example of selection thresholds for R = 0 and R = 5. Note: The figure uses the pa-
rameters β = 098 (per year), ρ = 011 (per year), and q = 075; G(·) is log normal with log mean
λm = 16 and log stdλσ = 036, which imply μ= 53.
The second part of the proposition characterizes how the optimal threshold s∗ varies
with R. The larger is the importance of the nonmonetary returns to the owner (as mea-
sured by a higher value of R), the greater is the value of the threshold s∗. This has two
contrasting effects on the productivity of the executives who get tenure. The fact that
∂s∗/∂R < 1 implies that as R increases, the productivity threshold for the executives who
develop a relationship (i.e., those with r =R) falls, since s∗ −R is decreasing in R. On the
other hand, the threshold for the executives who do not develop a valuable relationship
(i.e., those with r = 0) increases: these executives must compensate for their lack of “re-
lationship” value with a higher productivity, such that x ≥ s∗. As shown in Figure 1, the
ability thresholds for executives with and without relationship value, respectively given
by s∗ −R and s∗, move apart as R increases.
We now turn to the model prediction concerning the seniority composition of the
firm’s executives in a steady state. The fraction of senior executives in office, φ, follows
the law of motion
φt =φt−1(1− ρ)+ (1−φt−1)
(
1− F(s∗))
so that the steady state fraction of senior executives is
φ
(
s∗
)= 1
1+ ρ
1− F(s∗)
∈ (01) (4)
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which is decreasing in ρ. Mechanically, a lower hazard rate increases the fraction of se-
nior executives. It is also immediate that φ is decreasing in F(s∗). To study how φ de-
pends on R, we need to compute the total derivative of F(s∗), since changes in R affect
the CDF directly and also affect the threshold s∗. Note that
dF(s∗)
dR
= [qg(s∗ −R)+ (1− q)g(s∗)]∂s∗
∂R
− qg(s∗ −R) (5)
Recall that ∂s
∗
∂R < q (see Proposition 1) shows that the derivative is negative at R = 0,
which means that at R = 0, the share of senior executives is increasing in R. Intuitively,
when R > 0, the appeal of senior executives increases because, all other things equal,
their expected return is increased by the expected value of relationships, qR. However,
the effect of R on φ cannot be signed, in general, when R> 0, because an increase in R
has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it lowers the threshold s∗ − R for that frac-
tion (q) of senior executives who display valuable relationships (r =R); this increases φ.
On the other hand, a higher s∗ raises the acceptance threshold for the senior execu-
tive with no relationship capital (r = 0); this reduces φ. The final effect thus depends
on the features of the distribution of x and r. In fact, when q is sufficiently small and
R is sufficiently large, the option value of searching for an executive who delivers R is
high enough to induce a low retention rate.11 An example is displayed in the left panel
of Figure 2.
Figure 2. Share of senior executives and senior–junior differential as R varies. Note: The figure
uses the parameters β= 098 (per year), ρ= 011 (per year), and q= 075; G(·) is log normal with
log mean λm = 16 and log stdλσ = 036, which imply μ= 53.
11It is immediate to show that a decrease in q accompanied by a corresponding increase in R, to keep the
expected value of r fixed, leads to an increase in the variance of r. This, in turn, increases the option value
of searching for an executive who delivers the relationship value.
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We now analyze how changes in R affect the firm’s average productivity in the steady
state. Let X denote the mean productivity of the firm, given by the weighted average of
the expected productivity of the junior and senior executives,
X
(
s∗
)= Erx(x)= μ+φ(s∗)[Xo(s∗)−μ] (6)
where some algebra shows that the senior executives’ average productivity is
Xo
(
s∗
)= q
∫ ∞
s∗−R
xdG(x)+ (1− q)
∫ ∞
s∗
xdG(x)
1− F(s∗)  (7)
This leads us to the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let β→ 1. Then the steady state firm productivity X(s∗) is
(i) maximal under the policy s∗(R= 0), with ∂X∂R
∣∣
R=0= 0,
(ii) decreasing in R, ∂X∂R
∣∣
R>0< 0.
Proposition 2 shows that the mean productivity of a firm is maximized when the firm
only cares about ability, that is, under the policy s∗(R = 0). Any policy s∗(R) with R > 0
induces, on average, a lower firm productivity. Moreover, the proposition shows that X
is monotone decreasing in R.12 This will be useful in the discussion of the parameters
identification below. The assumption that β → 1 simplifies the derivation and is useful
to interpret the mean X as a cross section average.13 The proposition also establishes
that the derivative of X with respect to R is zero at R = 0. This result, and the fact that
the share of senior executives is increasing at R = 0 (discussed above), implies that the
productivity differential between senior and junior executives, Xo − μ, is decreasing in
R at R= 0, as can be seen from equation (7):
∂{Xo(s∗)−μ}
∂R
∣∣∣∣
R=0
=
g(s∗)
(
q− ∂s
∗
∂R
)[
s∗ −
∫ ∞
s∗
xdG(x)
1−G(s∗)
]
1−G(s∗) < 0
The intuition behind this pattern is simple: as R increases, the owner selects less on abil-
ity, so that the senior executives become more similar to the unselected pool of junior
12One might argue that in a competitive equilibrium, firms whose owners have a large R should not be
able to survive, as they are less efficient than small R firms. This is not necessarily the case. An owner who
enjoys a private benefit might be willing to accept a return on assets below the market return, as she is
trading off monetary for nonmonetary returns. Of course, she would still need to meet the no-bankruptcy
constraint, which is, however, less stringent than matching the market return. This implies that in equi-
librium, firms with different R’s—and, therefore, different productivity levels—can coexist. As discussed in
the literature review, there is evidence that the return on privately held firms is dominated by the market
portfolio (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)).
13The numerical analysis of the model for β ∈ (0851) (per year) gives very similar results. The relation-
ship between X and R is always decreasing.
428 Lippi and Schivardi Quantitative Economics 5 (2014)
executives. The right panel of Figure 2 shows that this pattern holds for a wide set of pa-
rameter values and, in particular, for the parameters that are in a (broad) neighborhood
of our structural estimates (thick line). The figure also shows that in the parametrization
with the high value of q = 075, both φ and Xo −μ become flat functions of R for R∼= 8:
at this point, owners are basically already firing all executives with r = 0 and keeping all
those with r = 8, so that further increases in R no longer influence the selection process.
In other words, X and φ asymptote to constant values as R grows large. We will come
back to this observation when we comment on the results of our estimates.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of our modeling assumptions about
the distribution of abilities. For the sake of simplicity, the model introduced an asymme-
try between ability and the relationship value, assuming that only the latter grows with
seniority. We notice that this is not a necessary assumption for Proposition 2(ii) to hold;
what is necessary for this result, even if we allowed ability to evolve with seniority, is that
such evolution is uncorrelated with R. Intuitively even if executives become more pro-
ductive when turning senior (on average), it would still be the case that owners who are
more interested in R will select more based on private benefits and less on productivity.
Of course, this result would break down if owners who care more about private ben-
efits are also attached to executives whose productivity increases relatively faster with
seniority than owners who are not interested in private benefits. This would be the case
if such owners, for example, invest more in executive training. Note, however, that in
such cases, the relationship between R and productivity could even become positive, an
implication we will be able to test (and dismiss) empirically.
4. Data description
In this section, we describe the main features of our data, referring to Appendix D for
more details. The data match a large sample of executives with a sample of Italian firms.
The executives represent approximately 2% of the firm’s employment. The firm data are
drawn from the Bank of Italy’s annual survey of manufacturing firms (INVIND), an open
panel of around 1200 firms per year that is representative of manufacturing firms with at
least 50 employees. It contains detailed information on firms’ characteristics, including
industrial sector, year of creation, number of employees, value of shipments, value of
exports, and investment. It also reports sampling weights to replicate the universe of
firms with at least 50 employees. We completed the data set with balance-sheet data
collected by the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS) since 1982, from which it was
possible to reconstruct the capital series using the perpetual inventory method. All these
manufacturing firms belong to the private sector and are, therefore, subject to the same
legislation, particularly in terms of labor laws.
Our measure of productivity is TFP. We assume that production takes place with a
Cobb–Douglas production function of the form
Yit = TFPitKβitLαit
where Y is value added, K is capital, L is labor, and i, t are firm and year indices, respec-
tively. TFP depends on average managerial ability X , and, possibly, on other additional
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observable and unobservable characteristics Wit , such as the industrial sector, the firm
size, and time effects,
TFPit =
(
1
nit
nit∑
j=1
Xj
)
eWit+it 
where nit is the number of executives in firm i at t, Xj is the ability of executive
j = 12     nit , and it is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shock un-
observed to the firm or, more simply, measurement error in TFP. We estimate TFP using
the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach. The procedure is briefly described in Appendix D;
full details are given in Cingano and Schivardi (2004).
The survey contains several questions regarding the controlling shareholder. The
most relevant for our purpose is “What is the nature of the controlling shareholder?,”
from which we construct an indicator that groups firms into one of four control cat-
egories (see Appendix D for the details): (i) individual or family; (ii) government (lo-
cal or central or other government controlled entities); (iii) conglomerate, that is, firms
belonging to an industrial conglomerate; (iv) institution, such as banks and insurance
companies, and foreign owners. We expect these different types of ownership to be char-
acterized by different degrees of relevance of personal relationships. For instance, own-
ers of family business are likely to derive utility from controlling the firm above and be-
yond the pure monetary returns. Part of these returns might come from a compliant
entourage and/or a group of executives who pursue the prestige of the family. A politi-
cian (the “owner” of a government-controlled firm) might want executives who serve his
political interests and might care little about how efficiently the firm is run. We therefore
expect these types of firms to be characterize by positive values of R. Firms controlled
by other entities, such as a foreign institution or a conglomerate, are instead more likely
to put weight on pure monetary returns.14 Independently from these presumptions, in
the estimation exercise we will not impose any restriction on the values of R and will let
the data speak.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the firm data used in the regression analysis
both for the total sample and by control type. For the total sample, on average, firms
have value added of 30 million euros (at 1995 prices) and employ 691 workers, of which
13 are executives. The average ratio of executives to total workforce is 26%. Around 41%
of firms are classified as medium high and high tech according to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2003) system, and 75% are located
in the north. Clear differences emerge according to the control type. Family firms are
substantially smaller than the average (11 million euros and less than 300 employees)
and specialize in more traditional activities. Importantly, they have a lower TFP level,
followed by government-controlled firms, while foreign firms have the highest TFP.
14We lump institutional and foreign owners together because both ownership types are not likely to be
identifiable with a single individual, so that from our perspective, it makes sense to assume a common R.
Moreover, these two types by themselves have substantially fewer observations than family or conglomerate
firms (see Table 1), making inference less reliable. We have experimented with five categories, distinguish-
ing between foreign and institutions, finding similar (although less precise) results.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: firms’ characteristics by control type.
VA Empl. No. Exec. % Exec. TFP % High Tech % North No. Obs. No. Firms
All firms
Mean 300 692 133 0026 241 041 074 7773 802
S.D. 1273 3299 291 0021 051 049 044
Family
Mean 112 281 57 0024 233 033 073 2906 349
S.D. 180 420 98 0016 046 047 044
Conglomerate
Mean 445 1024 150 0026 244 040 082 2390 300
S.D. 2142 5637 275 0025 054 049 039
Government
Mean 406 1013 218 0022 238 047 051 687 99
S.D. 874 2076 575 0021 061 050 050
Foreign
Mean 370 791 198 0030 253 052 075 1790 274
S.D. 691 1563 329 0022 048 050 044
Note: The notation VA is value added (in millions of 1995 euros), No. Exec. is the number of executives, % Exec. is the share
of executives over the total number of employees, TFP is the log of total factor productivity, % High Tech is the share of firms
classified as medium high and high tech according to the OECD classification system (OECD (2003)), % North is the share of
firms located in the North, No. Obs. is the number of firm-year observations, and No. Firms is the number of unique firms
observations.
The executives’ data are taken from the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale
(Social Security Institute (INPS)), which was asked to provide the complete work histo-
ries of all workers who were ever employed in an INVIND firm over the period 1981–
1997. Workers are classified as blue collar (operai), white collar (impiegati), and exec-
utives (dirigenti). The data on workers include age, gender, area where the employee
works, occupational status, annual gross earnings, number of weeks worked, and the
firm identifier. We only use workers classified as executives. In our preferred specifica-
tion, an executive turns senior after 5 years of tenure. Table 2 reports the statistics on
executives’ characteristics for the total sample and by control type. For the total sample,
average gross weekly earnings at 1995 constant prices are 1236 euros, and the share of
executives who have been with the firm at least 5 years is 057 and at least 7 years is 045.
Executives are, on average, 465 years old and 96% are male. Family-controlled firms pay
lower wages to their executives and have a higher share of senior executives (62%). Ex-
ecutives’ characteristics at conglomerate-controlled firms are fairly similar to the overall
ones. Government-controlled firms employ older and almost exclusively male execu-
tives. Finally, foreign-controlled firms pay their executives more, while their executives’
characteristics resemble the average in terms of the tenure, age, and gender composi-
tion.
5. Identification
This section discusses the mapping between the model and the data, and, in particular,
the data variability that identifies the model’s parameters. We first show that the model
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: executives’ characteristics by control type.
Wage φ5 φ7 Age % Male
All Firms
Mean 1236 057 045 465 096
S.D. 330 030 031 46 013
Family
Mean 1130 062 051 460 094
S.D. 288 033 033 53 017
Conglomerate
Mean 1294 053 041 466 097
S.D. 321 028 028 40 009
Government
Mean 1298 054 042 477 099
S.D. 349 027 027 46 003
Foreign
Mean 1309 054 043 469 096
S.D. 361 029 029 41 012
Note: Wage (gross, per week) is in 1995 euros; φ5 is the share of executives with at least 5 years of seniority, and φ7 is the
share with at least 7 years. Age is the average executives’ age and % Male is the share of male executives.
yields a restriction that has a natural interpretation in terms of an OLS regression run
over a cross section of firms of a given ownership type. This regression identifies a sub-
set of the model’s parameters, while allowing to control for several unobserved variables
that are not accounted for by our theory. We then show that more structural param-
eters can be identified by comparing the average X , φ values across ownership types.
These two sets of estimates exploit completely different dimensions of data variability.
The results, therefore, can be compared to gain some insights on the consistency of our
findings.
The model yields a simple prediction on the productivity differential between the se-
nior and the junior executives within a given ownership type. Fix R, q and consider a set
of firms drawn from a given model parametrization. Firm i employs ni executives. Those
firms differ with respect to the quality of executives, which depends on the realizations
of x+ r for each executive. The econometrician observes the firm’s productivity Xi and
the fraction of senior executives φi, where the mean productivity of firm i is given by
Xi =
∑ni
j=1 xij
ni
, and the fraction of senior executives is φi =
∑ni
j=1 Iij
ni
where, Iij is an indi-
cator function equal to 1 if executive j in firm i is senior. Let Xo and Xy = μ be the large
sample conditional productivity of the incumbent senior and junior executives, respec-
tively. If ni is not large, the average productivity will differ from Xo, Xy due to sampling
variability. Using equation (6), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The productivity of firm i can be written as
Xi = μ+ (Xo −μ)φi + εi (8)
where E{εi} = 0 and E{φiεi} = 0.
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A key result from this proposition is that deviations εi about the (large sample or
unconditional) mean values are uncorrelated with the share of senior executives φi. In-
tuitively, this property holds since an increase (or a decrease) in the quota of senior ex-
ecutives φi about its unconditional mean φ does not contain any information on the
innovation εi, that is, the amount by which the productivity of the senior (junior) exec-
utive exceeds the selection threshold s∗ in firm i. From a statistical point of view, this
result is an immediate corollary of the properties of the conditional mean. The propo-
sition implies that the productivity differential Xo − μ can be estimated with an OLS
regression of Xi on φi. The intuition is the following. When selection is weak (i.e., R is
large), two firms with different shares of senior executives differ little in productivity,
since, on average, senior executives are not much more productive than junior execu-
tives. This implies that the correlation between X and φ is low. If R is low, the selection
mechanism is effective, senior executives are, on average, more productive than junior
ones, and differences in φ will go together with substantial differences in X , yielding a
high correlation between X and φ.
Another prediction of the model concerns a comparison across ownership types.
Consider the firm productivity X and the fraction of senior executives φ. For a given
vector of model primitives β, ρ, G(·), Figure 3 shows that for each admissible (i.e., model
generated) observable pair X , φ, there is at most one pair of parameter values R, q that
can produce it. Each line in the figure is indexed by one value of q. Increasing q shifts the
locus upward: a higher probability of maturing a valuable relationship increases the like-
lihood of being tenured and hence φ. Notice that all lines depart from the same point in
the X , φ plane, which corresponds to R = 0. This is the productivity maximizing situa-
tion, obtained when relationships have no value. Starting from this point, an increase in
R moves the model outcomes along one line (indexed by q) from right to left. We know
Figure 3. Productivity and seniority: space spanned by the model. Note: The figure uses the
parameters β= 098 (per year) and ρ= 011 (per year); G(·) is log normal with log mean λm = 16
and log stdλσ = 036, which imply that log(μ)= 167.
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this because, as shown in Proposition 2, X is decreasing in R. Moreover, as discussed
above, the effect of an increase in R on φ is, in general, not monotone. This explains
why the lines that correspond to low values of q are hump-shaped. The important point
of this figure is that those lines never cross, so that given any point in the space spanned
by the model, one can invert it and retrieve the values of q and R that produced it.
Compared to this structural estimate, the regression of Proposition 3 only identifies
the productivity differential Xo − μ, and not the levels of R, q. The two approaches to
estimating the model that we discussed above are useful for a number of reasons. First,
they allow us to assess one key prediction of the model using different moments from
the data: while the structural estimates use the average values of X , φ of a given con-
trol type to back out the R, q parameters across types, the OLS regression exploits the
partial correlation coefficient between X and φ across firms for a given R, q. The lat-
ter estimate does not depend on the average X , φ for a given control type, but on how
X and φ covary across firms of a given type. This implies that the OLS estimates are
robust to potential differences in either TFP or seniority structure that, on average, af-
fect all firms in a control type equally. For example, one might argue that due to career
considerations, foreign-controlled firms are uniformly more appealing to junior execu-
tives than the other types. This would affect the structural estimates through changes
in the average φ across control types unrelated to R, but would not bias the OLS esti-
mates. A second important feature of the OLS estimates is that they do not require one
to pin down all the structural parameters. In particular, they are independent of (and,
of course, do not supply any information on) β, q, ρ, and G(·). They therefore offer a
test of robustness of the structural estimates with respect to the values of the auxiliary
parameters they hinge on. Finally, within a regression framework it is easy to perform
robustness analysis, something that we exploit in the next section.
6. Model-based OLS regressions
This section presents various estimates of the model predictions discussed in Proposi-
tion 3. After presenting the baseline estimates, we analyze their robustness and discuss
alternative hypotheses for interpreting the data.
6.1 Basic framework and results
Equation (8) establishes a relationship between the share of senior executives and firm-
level TFP that we use to construct an OLS-based estimate of the productivity differential
between senior and junior executives. By taking the log of both sides and applying a first
order Taylor expansion around Xi = μ, we obtain
logXi = γ0 + γ1φi +ηi (9)
with γ0 = logμ, γ1 = Xo−μμ , and ηi = 1μεi, and where, as shown in Proposition 3, εi is
uncorrelated with φi. This equation shows that in a regression of log TFP on the share
of senior executives, the coefficient γ1 measures the percentage difference in average
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ability between senior and junior executives. We bring equation (9) to the data using the
specification
logTFPit = γ0 + γ1φit + γfamDfam ·φit + γgovDgov ·φit + γforDfor ·φit
+ γ5Wit +ηit
where the dummies Dk with k = (famgov for) are control status dummies equal to 1
for family-, government-, and foreign-controlled firms, respectively, and Wit is a vector
of controls that includes year dummies, two-digit sector dummies, and control-status
dummies that account for potential unobserved heterogeneity across firms with differ-
ent control types. The coefficient γ1 measures the percentage difference in the average
ability of senior and junior executives in conglomerate-controlled firms, the reference
group in this specification. Under our assumption that the productivity of junior execu-
tives is the same across groups, the coefficients γk measure the difference in the average
ability of senior executives for the corresponding control type with respect to the con-
glomerate firms: γk = Xo(Rk)−Xo(Rcong). To obtain population consistent estimates,
we weight observations with population weights, available from the INVIND survey, un-
less otherwise specified.
The estimates reported in column (1) of Table 3 show that the relationship between
productivity and the share of senior executives is positive for conglomerate-controlled
firms: the coefficient is 011 with a standard error of 004. The positive sign of this coeffi-
cient is consistent with the selection hypothesis, that is, with the assumption that senior
executives are, on average, more productive than junior ones. To give a sense of the size
Table 3. TFP and share of senior executive relationship by control type.
Dependent Variable: logTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
φ 011∗∗∗ 002 008∗ 009∗∗ 011∗∗ 012∗∗∗
(004) (003) (004) (004) (004) (004)
φ · foreign −003 001 002 −005 002 −002
(006) (005) (007) (006) (007) (007)
φ · family −017∗∗∗ −010∗∗ −017∗∗∗ −013∗∗ −011∗∗ −013∗∗
(005) (004) (005) (005) (005) (005)
φ · government −047∗∗∗ −032∗∗∗ −042∗∗∗ −037∗∗∗ −034∗∗∗ −029∗∗
(009) (007) (011) (009) (011) (012)
Observations 5875 5943 4897 6840 5136 5136
R-squared 047 049 045 047 053 054
Note: The variable φ is the share of senior executives who have been with the firm at least 5 years in columns (1), (2), (5),
and (6), at least 7 years in column (3), and at least 3 years in column (4). All regressions are weighted with sampling weights with
the exception of column (2), which is unweighted. All regressions include control type dummies, year dummies, and two-digit
sector dummies. Column (5) also includes firm size (log of the number of employees), firm age (log), the average age of the
workforce (log), and the share of executives, of white collar workers, and of male workers as a fraction of the total workforce.
Column (6) includes the same additional controls as in column (5) interacted with ownership dummies. Robust standard errors
are given in parentheses. Significance levels for the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient are labelled with asterisks: ∗ is 10%,
∗∗ is 5%, and ∗∗∗ is 1%.
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of the effect, the productivity of a firm with a share of executives that is 1 standard devi-
ation above the mean (see Table 2) is higher by about 3%. The estimated coefficient for
the foreign-controlled firms, γfor is not statistically different from zero; hence, we can-
not reject the hypothesis that the selection in foreign-controlled firms is similar to that
in conglomerate-controlled firms at conventional levels of significance. Instead, selec-
tion appears to be significantly smaller in family firms, where senior executives are, on
average, 17% less productive than in conglomerate-controlled firms. Finally, we obtain
a very large negative coefficient for government firms (−047). This value implies a neg-
ative selection in such firms, that is, that junior executives are more efficient than senior
ones, an outcome that our model cannot predict (the worst selection we can have in the
model makes the productivity of the senior executives equal to that of the junior). This
indicates that government firms display some features that the model cannot match, an
issue that will also arise in the structural estimates of Section 7. Altogether, the sign and
magnitude of the effect is indicative of very poor selection in government-controlled
firms.
As a first robustness check, in column (2) we do not weight observations. In this
case, the results are somehow weaker: the coefficient on φ is positive but statistically
insignificant. The interaction terms for family and government are negative and signif-
icant, again pointing to weaker selection in these firms. Another important issue is the
length of time assumed necessary to become senior, which is 5 years in the baseline re-
gressions. It is important to check to what extent our results depend on this choice. To
do so, in column (3), we use a 7-year-based definition of seniority, and in column (4),
we use a 3-year definition. We find no substantial differences with respect to the basic
specification.
6.2 Additional robustness checks and alternative hypotheses
This section discusses potential criticisms of the regressions reported above to further
assess their robustness. A first criticism of the regression analysis may concern an omit-
ted variable bias. Our stylized theoretical model excludes other potential determinants
of seniority and productivity. For example, a firm with a good human resource (HR) de-
partment might be more productive and better at retaining senior managers. Formally,
let Zi measure the quality of the HR department and assume that the correct regression
equation is
logXi = γ0 + γ1φi + γ2Zi +ηi
Then the estimated coefficient on seniority using (9) would be equal to γˆ1 = γ1 +
γ2
cov(φiZi)
var(φi)
. The omitted variable hypothesis might thus offer an alternative explana-
tion of the correlation between seniority (φ) and productivity (X) that we found within
each ownership type. But notice that while this bias might explain the presence of a
positive correlation between productivity and seniority, more assumptions are neces-
sary to challenge our main finding, namely that γˆ1 differs across control types in the
way predicted by our theory. In particular, to reproduce our finding that the conditional
correlation between X and φ is high in firms under conglomerate control and is small
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in family firms requires us to assume much more than an omitted variable, namely that
either γ2 or cov(φiZi)/var(φi) differs systematically across ownership types. Following
up on the above example, one would need a theory that explains why the quality of the
HR department has a different impact on productivity and/or on the seniority structure
in, for example, family with respect to conglomerate firms. To challenge our identifica-
tion mechanism one needs an alternative theory of why the effect of an omitted variable
varies across control types. We were unable to identify any obvious alternative explana-
tion in the literature.
Despite this important theoretical objection, we further explore the role of omitted
variables empirically, as our data base contains a rich set of firm characteristics, partic-
ularly on the workforce composition, owing to the matched employer–employee nature
of the data. Rather than trying to propose and dismiss a specific hypothesis, we select a
set of potential determinants of productivity and include them in the regression. In col-
umn (5) of Table 3 we report the results when including, as additional controls, firm size
(log of the number of employees), firm age, the average age of the workforce, and the
share of executives, of white collar workers, and of male workers as a fraction of the total
workforce. To save on space, we report the coefficients on these additional controls in
Table 9 in Appendix D. Even with this very rich set of controls, the pattern that emerges
from the data is unchanged: the share of senior executives is positively correlated with
TFP in conglomerate- and foreign-controlled firms, while it is significantly lower in the
other two types.
A potential criticism of the specification of column (5) is that we are giving the share
of senior executives a better chance to affect the results than to the other controls, since
the coefficient of the seniority share varies by control type while those of the additional
controls do not. We relax this restriction in column (6), where all the additional regres-
sors listed above are interacted with the control type dummies. Again, the results are
hardly affected. Interestingly, the interaction between the additional controls and the
ownership type dummies are almost all insignificantly different from zero (Table 9 in
Appendix D), suggesting that the differential response we find for the share of senior
managers is not a general feature of the data.
One might still argue that only exogenous variation in φ can conclusively dismiss
omitted variable bias (as well as any other endogeneity concern). We argue that this is
not the case. The estimates of the productivity differential, Xo − μ, are based on the
model predicted correlation between the share of senior managers and productivity, and
do not reflect a generic form of causation from seniority to productivity. In fact, changes
in φ that are not attributable to the selection mechanism will not identify Xo − μ. For
example, an exogenous increase in the share of senior managers derived from a tighten-
ing of labor market regulation that makes firing more costly would reduce the selection
and weaken the seniority–productivity correlation.15 In other words, the interpretation
of our estimate is the correct one under our maintained assumption that the theoretical
model is the data generating process. In this sense, the estimates are structural, and the
OLS correlation, as opposed to instrumental variable estimation, is the proper way to
measure selection consistently with our model.
15Note that in Italy, over the period considered, executives can be fired at will, so this issue does not arise.
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As a final set of robustness checks, we have experimented with the measure of per-
formance. We have estimated the production function directly, rather than using the
two-step procedure that first estimates TFP and then relates it to the share of senior ex-
ecutives. The results are reported and discussed in Appendix D. They are aligned with
those of Table 3. We have also used profit-based measures of performance, as profits
might capture different dimensions of managerial ability.16 The results using return on
assets (ROA) are reported in Table 4. In this case, the coefficient on the share of senior ex-
ecutives can be interpreted as the difference in the average contribution to ROA of senior
and junior executives. The patterns we find are exactly the same as those that emerge
when the productivity measure is used; if anything, they are stronger. In particular, prof-
itability is positively related to the share of senior executives in conglomerate-controlled
firms.17 The interaction for foreign firms is not significantly different from zero, while it
is negative and significant for family and government firms. Again, for the latter, the ef-
fect is very strong, indicating negative selection in such firms. This is fully consistent
with the results obtained when performance is measured by TFP. In particular, in fam-
ily and government firms, the selection effect for senior executives is absent compared
Table 4. ROA and share of senior executives by control type.
Dependent Variable: ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
φ 340∗∗∗ 293∗∗∗ 230∗∗∗ 322∗∗∗ 395∗∗∗ 401∗∗∗
(075) (066) (085) (074) (086) (086)
φ · foreign −157 024 −092 −071 032 034
(138) (107) (135) (136) (160) (165)
φ · family −448∗∗∗ −369∗∗∗ −332∗∗∗ −425∗∗∗ −388∗∗∗ −405∗∗∗
(095) (078) (107) (096) (105) (105)
φ · government −750∗∗∗ −373∗∗ −471∗∗ −722∗∗∗ −582∗∗∗ −595∗∗
(161) (150) (184) (167) (211) (232)
Observations 5875 5943 4897 6840 5136 5136
R-squared 008 009 008 008 012 013
Note: ROA is return on assets, in percentage units; φ is the share of senior executives who have been with the firm at least
5 years in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6), at least 7 years in column (3), and at least 3 years in column (4). All regressions are
weighted with sampling weights with the exception of column (2), which is unweighted. All regressions include control type
dummies, year dummies, and two-digit sector dummies. Column (5) also includes firm size (log of the number of employees),
firm age (log), the average age of the workforce (log), and the share of executives, of white collar workers, and of male workers as
a fraction of the total workforce. Column (6) includes the same additional controls as in column (5) interacted with ownership
dummies. Robust standard errors in given in parentheses. Significance levels for the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient are
labelled by asterisks: ∗ is 10%, ∗∗ is 5%, and ∗∗∗ is 1%.
16Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) showed that efficiency and profitability might not be simply
one-to-one. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) showed that family firms in France pay lower wages in exchange for
more job security. Owners of family firms might, therefore, attract lower quality, higher risk-averse execu-
tives and pay them less. In principle, family firms might, therefore, be both less efficient and more prof-
itable.
17To get a sense of the size of the estimated effect, considering a firm whose share of senior executives
increases by 1 standard deviation above the mean (see Table 2) would increase ROA by 1 percentage point
(the median ROA is 78; the mean is 86).
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to the other control types. Moreover, the results are robust to all the additional checks
performed for TFP, reported in columns (2)–(6). Similar results are obtained when using
return on equity (not reported for brevity). This shows that our results are robust with
respect to different performance measures.
To conclude, the OLS estimates indicate that there are substantial differences in the
effectiveness of the selection process of executives across different types of owners. We
have argued that such differences are not likely to be due to omitted variable bias or to
one specific performance indicator. We now turn to the structural estimation exercise,
which will allow us to check if these conclusions are confirmed and to assess the effects
of the private benefits from personal relationships on firms’ productivity through coun-
terfactual exercises.
7. Estimates of the structural parameters
This section presents the structural estimation of the model parameters. We begin by
discussing the assumptions needed for identification using firm-level observations on
TFP and seniority of the executives, which we see as empirical measures of Xi and φi,
that is, the observed productivity and share of senior executives in firm i. A third observ-
able used for the estimation is the variance of the regression residual in equation (9),
which we label var(ηi).
The estimation is developed under the assumption of observed heterogeneity, as
some structural parameters are linked to observable characteristics of the firm, along
the lines of Alvarez and Lippi (2009). The distribution of productivity G(x) is assumed
to be log normal, so that the model is characterized by six fundamental parameters: the
discount factor β, the hazard rate ρ, the log normal parameters λm and λσ (log mean and
log standard deviation, respectively), the probability of developing a relationship, q, and
the value of the relationship R. Five parameters, namely β, ρ, q, λσ , and λm, are assumed
to be common to all firms. The parameter R is assumed to vary with one observable
characteristic of the firm: the control type. Given a parametrization (i.e., the vector β,
ρ, q, λσ , λm, R), the model uniquely determines the values of X , φ, and var(η) to be
observed in the data. In the estimation procedure, the differences between data points
with identical observables (e.g., two firms with the same control type) are accounted for
by classical measurement error. Next, we fill in the details that relate to the data used in
the estimation, and describe the estimation algorithm and the results.
Our parsimonious structural estimates concern seven parameters: θp ∈ Θ71, p =
12    7, described next. The firm-level observations vary across 14 years (index t), 13
two-digit sectors (index τ), and four control types described in the previous section (in-
dex κ). We assume that R varies across firms according to the nature of the controlling
stakeholder, with Rκ = θκ, κ = 1234, for the firms with control type family (θ1), con-
glomerate (θ2), government (θ3), and foreign (θ4), respectively. The parameter λm = θ5
measures the mean (log) TFP of the firm. In the data, TFP has a clear time component as
well as a sectoral one, which are ignored by the simple structure of our model. Thus, be-
fore turning to the structural estimation, we normalize the TFP data by removing com-
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mon time and sector effects. Our measure of X for firm i in year t and sector τ is thus
given by
logXitτ ≡ logTFPitτ − a1 · yearit − a2 · sectiτ − a3 ·Zitτ (10)
where a1 and a2 are the vectors of coefficients from an OLS regression of TFP on 13 year
and 12 two-digit sector dummies. We also consider a specification that controls for the
effect of firm size Zitτ (log employment) on TFP. The parameter θ6 measures the prob-
ability of developing a relationship q = θ61+θ6 . The parameter θ7 measures the standard
deviation of the ability distribution (see Appendix C for a discussion of the mapping be-
tween this parameter and the observable regression squared error var(ηi)).
To reduce the computational burden, two parameters are pinned down outside the
estimation routine. The time discount β is calibrated to an annual value of 098, as is
standard in the literature. The hazard rate of senior executives, ρ, is computed from the
survival function of senior executives, that is, with at least 5 years of seniority, using the
Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimator on the individual data. We estimate ρ= 011 per year,
which implies that the expected tenure of senior executives is approximately 10 years.
These assumptions imply that after removing time and sectoral differences, all firms
in a group—indexed by the control type κ= 1234—are expected to have the same X
and φ. For each firm i in group κ, there are two observables yjiκ, j = 12. We assume
that the variable yjiκ is measured with error e
j
i that is normal, with zero mean, inde-
pendent across variables, groups, and observations. Inspection of the raw data suggests
that measurement error is multiplicative in levels for TFP, X , and additive for the share
of senior executives, φ.18 Hence the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates use the ob-
servables y1iκ = logXiκ and y2iκ = φiκ. The measurement error variance σ2j , j = 12, is
assumed common across groups, and is computed as the variance of the residuals of an
OLS regression of logX and φ on year and sector dummies. This gives σ2logX = 035 and
σ2φ = 029. Finally, for each control group κ, we use the variance of the regression resid-
ual in equation (9) as the third observable, y3κ = var(η), to be fitted by the model for each
group.
Let f j(Θκ) be the model prediction for the jth variable in group κ under the pa-
rameter setting Θ. The observation for the corresponding variable for firm i in group κ
is
y
j
iκ = f j(Θκ)+ eji 
Let Y be the vector of observations and let nκ be the number of firms i in group κ. Define
the objective function F as
F(Θ;Y)≡
4∑
κ=1
3∑
j=1
(
nκ
σ2j
)(
1
nκ
nκ∑
i=1
y
j
iκ − f j(Θκ)
)2
 (11)
18This statement is based on an analysis of the deviations of X and φ (in levels and in logs) from the
mean of each groups. Details are available from the authors on request.
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Table 5. Structural estimates of model parameters.
q Rfam Rcong Rgov Rfor λm λσ
A. Baseline 078 55 33 60 35 159 039
(25) (86) (101) (63) (103) (769) (309)
B. With firm size 076 51 34 69 35 159 040
(25) (88) (102) (43) (99) (744) (305)
Note: The t-statistics are given in parentheses. The estimation uses the estimated measurement errors σ2logX = 035 and
σ2φ = 029. The parameters β and ρ are calibrated (see the main text). The measure for productivity logX is the firm-level
(log) TFP net of the common components due to year effects and sector effects, as from equation (10) (see the main text); in
specification B, firm-size effects (as measured by the (log) number of employees) are also controlled for.
Appendix E shows that the likelihood function is related to the objective function by
logL(Θ;Y) = −1
2
4∑
κ=1
3∑
j=1
nκ
(
1+ log(2πσ2j ))− 12F(Θ;Y)
We estimate the structural parameters in Θ by minimizing (11). At each iteration, the
algorithm solves the model for each of the four groups and computes the objective func-
tion under the candidate parametrization. Since each group has three observables, there
is a total of 12 moments to be fitted using 7 parameters; hence, the model is overiden-
tified with 5 degrees of freedom. The formulas for the score and the information matrix
used for the inference are derived in Appendix E.
The estimates of the model structural parameters are reported in Table 5. The esti-
mated value of q = 078 indicates that approximately 75% of the executives develop a
relationship. The value of R varies substantially across control types, but all types en-
joy some degree of private benefits: R is always significantly different from zero. This is
consistent with the findings of Taylor (2010), according to which CEO entrenchment is
substantial even in U.S. listed firms, where family and government firms play a minor
role. The importance of the relationships is lowest for firms that belong to a conglomer-
ate (33), followed by foreign-controlled firms (35), family (55), and government (60).
Given that the estimated unconditional mean level of TFP is around 7, the estimated
values for R show that the nonmonetary characteristics of the executives (i.e., their rela-
tionship value) are quantitatively important in the selection process.
To help with the interpretation of the structural estimates, Table 6 computes selected
statistics produced by the model in the steady state at the estimated parameters. The
first column solves the model for the (counterfactual) case in which the firm’s owner
gives no value to relationships in executive selection (R = 0) and, hence, s∗ = x∗ for all
senior executives. In this case, senior executives are confirmed if their ability x is above
x∗ = 62, which occurs in around 25% of cases. The (log) average ability of senior execu-
tives is 209, almost 30% higher than the unconditional average ability of junior execu-
tives. On average, around 38% of executives are senior in this “frictionless” case. These
figures can be compared to those obtained for family firms (second column of the ta-
ble), for which s∗ = 86 and x∗ = s∗ −R= 31 (the latter is the cutoff ability of executives
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Table 6. Model predictions under the baseline estimates.
Control Type
R= 0 Family Conglomerate Government Foreign
R 0 55 33 60 35
s∗ 62 86 74 89 75
x∗ 62 31 42 29 41
logμ 167 167 167 167 167
logX 185 172 179 171 178
logXo 209 175 187 173 186
logXo|R= 0 209 234 222 237 223
logXo|R> 0 209 173 185 172 183
φ 038 061 055 062 056
Fired 073 030 045 027 043
Fired|R= 0 072 092 086 093 086
Fired|R> 0 072 011 034 008 031
Note: The table reports key statistics for the steady state of our model solved using the benchmark estimates of Table 5:
logX is the (log) average managerial ability, Xo is the average managerial ability of the senior executives, logXo|R = 0 is the
average ability of the senior who did not develop a relationship, and logXo|R> 0 is the average ability of executives who devel-
oped a relationship. Fired is the probability that a junior executive is replaced when turning senior.
who have developed a relationship with the owner). It is apparent that selection is much
weaker in family-controlled firms: the senior executives’ average ability (Xo) is only 8%
higher than that of junior executives (μ). An executive who develops a relationship has a
92% chance of being tenured. This probability drops to 11% for a senior executive who
does not develop a relationship. For conglomerate- and foreign-controlled firms, the sit-
uation is intermediate between theR= 0 case and the family-firm case. The productivity
of the senior executives in conglomerate firms is about 20% higher than the productiv-
ity of junior executives, which indicates a much greater selection than in family firms.
For government firms, the estimates imply that selection occurs almost exclusively on
the basis of developing a relationship: 93% of executives with r =R are retained; 92% of
those with r = 0 are fired. As a consequence, the average ability of senior executives is
only slightly higher than that of junior executives as the selection effect is inhibited.
The structural estimates allow us to develop a simple counterfactual exercise: set-
ting the private benefits to zero implies a productivity gain of 6% in conglomerates,
7% in foreign firms, 13% in family firms, and 14% in government firms. If we take
conglomerate-owned firms, which record the lowest value private benefits, as a bench-
mark, productivity is around 6% lower in family firms and 10% lower in government
firms due to weaker selection. In light of the model and consistent with much anecdotal
evidence, this happens because family- and government-controlled firms select exec-
utives by putting a large emphasis on nonmonetary values, independent of executive
ability, thus reducing the productivity-enhancing effect of managerial selection.
An important robustness check consists of comparing the structural and the OLS es-
timates. As argued above, the OLS estimates measure the difference in the average ability
of senior and junior managers: Xo − μ. It is immediate to compute this statistic for the
structural estimates as well. In Table 7, we report the OLS results (taken from the first
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Table 7. Comparison between the structural and the OLS estimates.
logXocong − logμ Xofor Xofam Xogov
OLS estimates 011 −003 −017 −047
Structural estimates 020 −001 −012 −014
Note: The first row reports the OLS regression estimates from column (1) of Table 3. The first column represents the dif-
ference in senior–junior ability in conglomerate firms. The second, the third, and the fourth columns report the difference in
the senior executives’ average ability for each control type with respect to conglomerates: Xoi ≡ logXoi − logXocong, where
i= (for famgov).
column of Table 3) and compare them with the corresponding values implied by the es-
timates of Table 6. First, both estimation methods imply a positive effect of selection on
the senior–junior productivity differential for conglomerate firms: 011 in the OLS and
020 in the structural estimates. The other columns report the difference in the ability of
the senior managers for the relevant control type as compared to conglomerate firms,
the most efficient type. For foreign firms, the difference is −001, a value that is close
to that produced by the OLS estimates (−003). For family firms, both estimates show
that selection is substantially weaker than in conglomerate-controlled firms. Although
the OLS estimate is larger in absolute value than the structural estimate (−017 versus
−012), with a standard error of 005 in the OLS estimates, we cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that the two values are the same at conventional levels of significance. Finally, the
OLS give a very large negative coefficient for government firms (−047). This value im-
plies a negative selection in such firms, that is, that junior executives are more efficient
than senior ones. This is a result that the structural model cannot deliver; in fact, the
structural estimates are close to the lowest possible selection effect, with −014, so that
the average ability of senior and junior managers is almost the same. All in all, it is re-
markable that the two sets of estimates give comparable results, although they are based
on totally different dimensions of data variability.
We have further explored the robustness of our results. We saw in Table 1 that av-
erage firm size differs across control types. We reestimated equation (10) with the in-
clusion of firm size among the determinants of TFP and estimated the model with this
measure of ability. The results are reported in the lower panel of Table 5 and are similar
to those without firm size. All the quantitative predictions are virtually identical to those
obtained under the baseline specification. A second robustness check relates to the es-
timate of the standard deviation of the ability distribution. In a previous version of this
paper, we used additional information on executive compensation to estimate the stan-
dard deviation of the ability distribution outside the structural estimation routine (see
Lippi and Schivardi (2010) for details). Again, the results we obtained were very similar
to those reported here. All in all, our results have proven to be remarkably robust and
consistent across specifications and estimation methods.
8. Concluding remarks
We formulated a model of executive selection in which the firm’s owner cares about
managerial ability and, in addition, derives a private benefit from developing a personal
relationship with the executives. The theory yields joint predictions on two observables:
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the firm’s average productivity and the share of senior executives in the firm. Compared
to an owner who is only interested in ability, the selection of executives in the case of
multiple objectives reduces the productivity of the firm and the rate at which execu-
tives leave the company. These predictions can be “inverted” to back out the structural
parameters of the model; in particular, to infer the value of the personal relationship
with executives enjoyed by the firm’s owner. We estimated the model using matched
employer–employee data for a sample of Italian firms and found that the nonmone-
tary objectives are quantitatively important. In particular, the value of personal rela-
tionships is highest in the firms under government and family control, and is smallest in
conglomerate- or foreign-owned firms. From a quantitative point of view, those differ-
ences account for up to an 8% differential in the firms’ TFP. These results are robust to
several controls and estimation methods.
One important question is what mechanisms could mitigate the inefficiency in exec-
utive selection that we identify. We expect that competition in the product markets and
contestability of control would reduce the extent of such inefficiency. We plan to explore
this in future work.
Appendix A: The threshold rule in closed form
This appendix characterizes the optimal threshold s∗ as the unique solution of one equa-
tion in one unknown, and provides closed form expressions for the value functions ex-
pressed in terms of s∗. Using equation (2) and the optimal threshold s∗, it is straightfor-
ward to compute the expected value of a senior executive conditional on being in office
as
vo ≡ Es
(
vo(s)|s ≥ s∗
)= ∫ ∞
s∗
s
dF(s)
1− F(s∗) +β
[
ρvy + (1− ρ)vo
]
(12)
= 1
1−β(1− ρ)
(∫ ∞
s∗
s
dF(s)
1− F(s∗) +βρvy
)

Given s∗, the expected value of a junior executive can be rewritten as
vy = μ+β
[
F
(
s∗
)
vy +
(
1− F(s∗))vo] (13)
Using equation (13) and the expression for vo in equation (12) gives a closed form equa-
tion for vy as a function of s∗:
vy =
μ(1−β(1− ρ))+β
∫ ∞
s∗
s dF(s)
(1−β)[1+β(ρ− F(s∗))]  (14)
Using equation (2) to write the value of a senior executive of type s∗ as
vo
(
s∗
)= 1
1−β(1− ρ)
(
s∗ +βρvy
)
and replacing this expression into equation (3) gives the optimality condition
s∗ = (1−β)vy (15)
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Using equation (15) and the expression for vy in (14) gives one equation in one unknown
for s∗:
H
(
s∗R
)≡ s∗[1+β(ρ− F(s∗))]−μ(1−β(1− ρ))−β∫ ∞
s∗
s dF(s)= 0 (16)
Appendix B: Proofs
This appendix provides the proofs of the three propositions in the paper. The arguments
are based on standard analysis and probability notions.
Proof of Proposition 1. Simple algebra shows that H(s∗R) is continuous in s∗,
that H(0R) < 0, and that the first order derivative with respect to (w.r.t.) s∗ is positive,
Hs∗(s∗R) = 1+ β(ρ− F(s∗)) > 0, and in the limit, lims∗→∞Hs∗(s∗R) > 0. Hence, there
exists one and only one s∗ > 0 that solves equation (16).
We now show that the implicit function s∗(R) is increasing inR. Applying the implicit
function theorem to equation (16) gives
∂s∗
∂R
=
(1−β)∂vy
∂R
1− (1−β)∂vy
∂s∗
 (17)
Let us use expression (14) to compute
∂vy
∂s∗
=
(
−βs∗f (s∗)[(1−β)(1+β(ρ− F(s∗))]
+β(1−β)f (s∗)[μ(1−β(1− ρ))+β∫ ∞
s∗
s dF(s)
])
/[
(1−β)(1+β(ρ− F(s∗)))]2
= βf (s∗)−s
∗ + (1−β)
μ(1−β(1− ρ))+β
∫ ∞
s∗
s dF(s)
(1−β)(1+β(1− F(s∗)))
(1−β)(1+β(1− F(s∗)))
= βf (s∗) −s∗ + (1−β)vy
(1−β)(1+β(1− F(s∗))) 
Using that at the optimum, (1−β)vy = s∗, gives ∂vy∂s∗ = 0. Hence ∂s
∗
∂R = (1−β)∂vy∂R . Next, we
show that 0< (1−β)∂vy∂R < 1. Rewrite the integral term in the numerator of (14) as∫ ∞
s∗
s dF(s) = q
∫ ∞
s∗−R
(x+R)dG(x)+ (1− q)
∫ ∞
s∗
xdG(x)
= q
(
R
(
1−G(s∗ −R))+ ∫ ∞
s∗−R
xdG(x)
)
+ (1− q)
∫ ∞
s∗
xdG(x)
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Using this expression in (14) and taking the derivative w.r.t. R yields
(1−β)∂vy
∂R
= β
∂
∫ ∞
s∗
s dF(s)
∂R
+ (1−β)vy ∂F(s
∗)
∂R
1+β(1− F(s∗))
= βq [1−G(s
∗ −R)+Rg(s∗ −R)+ (s∗ −R)g(s∗ −R)] − s∗g(s∗ −R)
1+β(1− F(s∗))
= βq 1−G(s
∗ −R)
1+β(1− F(s∗)) ∈ (01)
where the second equality uses s∗ = (1−β)vy .
Finally we show that s∗ > μ. Note that for R = 0, equation (1) gives F(z) = G(z).
Using equation (16) to evaluate and H(s∗R) at R= 0 gives
H
(
s∗0
)= (s∗ −μ)(1+βρ)+β(μ− ∫ ∞
s∗
z dG(z)− s∗G(s∗))
Simple algebra shows that at s∗ = μ, we have that H(μ0) < 0 (since μ−∫∞μ z dG(z) < 0).
Using that H(s∗R) is increasing in s∗ implies that s∗(0) > μ. Using that s∗(R) is increas-
ing in R implies that s∗(R) > μ for any R≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Rewrite the average productivity X defined in equation (6)
as
X = μ+
q
∫ ∞
s∗−R
xdG(x)+ (1− q)
∫ ∞
s∗
xdG(x)−μ(1− F(s∗))
1+ ρ− F(s∗) 
The parameter R enters this expression directly and via s∗. Taking the first order deriva-
tive with respect to R, accounting for both direct and indirect effects, gives (after some
algebra and collecting terms)
∂X
∂R
= 1
1+ ρ− F(s∗) ·
[
qRg
(
s∗ −R)∂(s∗ −R)
∂R
+ ∂F(s
∗)
∂R
(18)
×
(ρμ+ q∫ ∞
s∗−R
xdG(x)+ (1− q)
∫ ∞
s∗
xdG(x)−μ(1− F(s∗))
1+ ρ− F(s∗) − s
∗
)]

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Now use equation (16) with β= 1 to get the implicit equation for s∗:
s∗ =
ρμ+
∫ ∞
s∗
s dF(s)
1+ ρ− F(s∗)
=
ρμ+ q
∫ ∞
s∗−R
xdG(x)+ (1− q)
∫ ∞
s∗
xdG(x)+ qR(1−G(s∗ −R))
1+ ρ− F(s∗) 
Replacing the expression on the right hand side for s∗ into equation (18) and using the
expression for ∂F(s
∗)
∂R computed in equation (5) gives (after some rearranging and can-
cellations)
∂X
∂R
= qR
1+ ρ− F(s∗)
[
g
(
s∗ −R)(1+ ρ− (q+ (1− q)G(s∗))
1+ ρ− F(s∗)
)
∂(s∗ −R)
∂R
(19)
− 1−G(s
∗ −R)
1+ ρ− F(s∗) (1− q)g
(
s∗
)∂s∗
∂R
]

Inspection of equation (19) and the results on the sign of the partial derivatives estab-
lished in Proposition 1 reveal that the derivative is zero at R= 0 and that it is negative at
R> 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Define ζij as the deviation of a senior executive j from the
productivity of senior executives, Xo. Analogously, let ξij be the deviation of a junior
executive j from μ. Naturally, the expected value of those deviations is zero. In a small
sample of size n, the average productivity of junior and senior incumbent executives in
firm i can be written as
Xoi =Xo + 1
noi
noi∑
j=1
ζij Xyi = μ+ 1
n− noi
n−noi∑
j=1
ξij
Then
εi ≡φi
(
1
noi
noi∑
j=1
ζij − 1
n− noi
n−noi∑
j=1
ξij
)
+ 1
n− noi
n−noi∑
j=1
ξij (20)
We show that cov(φiεi) = 0, so that the OLS regression assumptions are satisfied.
Let n be the number of executives in each firm. For notational convenience, let us define
zi ≡ 1noi
∑noi
j=1 ζij and ui ≡ 1n−noi
∑n−noi
j=1 ξij to write
cov(φiεi)= E
[
φ2i (zi − ui)+φiui
]−E(φi)E[φi(zi − ui)+ ui]
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The key to the proof is that the conditional expectation E(zi|noi = k) = 0 for all k=
01     n. To see this, note that for a given k,
E
[
1
k
k∑
j=1
ζij
∣∣∣∣noi = k
]
= 1
k
k∑
j=1
E
(
ζij|xij + rij > s∗
)= 0
This holds since E(ζij|xij + rij > s∗) = 0 for each j. Recall that ζij is the deviation of
senior executive productivity xj from senior executive unconditional productivity Xo. It
is immediate that conditioning on the information that an executive is tenured does not
provide any information on how much above (or below) the average tenured executives’
level (Xo) he is.
Recall that φi takes the values (0 1n     
k
n     1). As productivity realization is in-
dependent across executives, the probability of each φi = kn outcome is Pr(kn )≡ p(kn)
from a binomial distribution. Then (for a= 12)
Eφz
(
φai zi
) = Eφ[Ez(φazi)|φi =φ]= n∑
k=0
p(kn)Ez
[(
k
n
)a
· zi
∣∣∣noi = k
]
=
n∑
k=0
p(kn)
(
k
n
)a
Ez[zi|noi = k] =
n∑
k=0
p(kn)
(
k
n
)a
· 0= 0
The same logic shows that Eφu(uiφai )= 0 for a= 12. This is immediate as the pro-
ductivity of the junior is not observed by the owner and. hence, it cannot be correlated
with his decisions about the tenure of the senior executives. 
Appendix C: Identifying the variance of the distribution of abilities
This section shows that the model of Section 3 can be inverted to infer the variance
of the distribution of abilities from a moment that is available in the data. Recall that
the distribution of abilities G(·) is chosen to be log normal so that it is defined by two
parameters: λm and λσ , respectively, the log mean and the log standard deviation of x.
Now notice that a given vector of model primitives β, ρ, λm, λσ , R, and q, in addition
to determining the observable pair X , φ, also determines the variance of the selected x,
which we denote by var(ηi), in accordance with equation (9).
Intuitively, a larger variance of the primitive parameter λσ increases the option value
of waiting, thus raising the selection threshold μ¯ and the steady state proportion of se-
nior executives φ as well as the ex post variance of abilities.
Figure 4 shows how the standard deviation of the distribution of abilities std(η)
varies as a function of the dispersion of abilities λσ . The figure has three lines, each one
corresponding to a different value of R. Notice that for a given R, a larger volatility of
the unfiltered distribution implies a larger variance in the selected sample: std(η). Such
monotone curves are invertible and can thus be used to estimate λσ .
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Figure 4. Model comparative statics as λσ varies. Note: The figure uses the parameters β= 098
(per year), ρ= 011 (per year), and q= 075, and G(·) is log normal with log mean λm = 16.
Table 8. Estimated variance of abilities across control types.
Family Conglomerate Government Foreign
Estimated var(ηi) 030 037 039 043
Number obs. 2162 1818 1393 502
Note: We use the estimates in column (1) of Table 3 to obtain the standard deviation of the residuals of the productiv-
ity equation by control type. Given that the estimates use sample weight, we use the same weights to compute the standard
deviation.
The empirical proxy of std(η) that we used is taken from the standard deviation of
the residual in the regression of equation (9). This is fully consistent with our theory
provided that the number of executives in each firm is finite, a reasonable assumption
as our firms on average employ about seven executives. Table 8 reports the sample esti-
mates of std(η) that are used as observables in the structural estimation.
Appendix D: Data and OLS regressions details
The INVIND survey is based on a questionnaire comprised of a fixed and monographic
section that changes from year to year, used to investigate in-depth specific aspects of
firms’ activity. In 1992, a large section was devoted to corporate control. The determi-
nation of the nature of the controlling shareholders begins with that year. Among other
things, the questionnaire asked about each firm’s main shareholder, distinguishing be-
tween 10 different categories. Since 1992, the questions on control structure have been
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included every year. Starting in 1996, the categories have been reduced to five: (i) indi-
vidual or family; (ii) government (local or central or other publicly controlled entities);
(iii) conglomerate; (iv) institution (financial or not); (v) foreign owner. We collapse the
last two categories into one and map the previous classification into these four groups.
Before 1992, the nature of the controlling shareholder was not investigated. However, in
1992 the firm was asked the year of the most recent change in control. We extend the
control variable of 1992 back to the year of the most recent control change. Moreover, if
a firm has a certain controller type in year t and the same in year t ′, and some missing
values in the year in between, we assume that the control has remained of the same type
for the entire period [t t ′]. Note that there might be some cases of misclassification, in
particular among firms that are classified as not controlled by an individual. For exam-
ple, a foreign entity that controls a resident firm might in turn be controlled by a resident
who uses the offshore firm for taxation purposes. The same holds true for firms that re-
port an institution as the controlling shareholder. This would bias the difference in the
estimates between family and nonfamily firms downward, because we would be classi-
fying as foreign some family firms (the opposite case is not very likely). This implies that
our results can be seen as a lower bound of the difference we find.
The CADS data are used to construct the capital stock using the permanent inven-
tory method. Investment is at book value, adjusted using the appropriate two-digit de-
flators and depreciation rates, derived from National Accounts published by the Na-
tional Institute for Statistics. For consistency with the capital data, in the estimation of
the production function we take value added and labor from the CADS data base. Both
the INVIND and the CADS samples are unbalanced, so that not all firms are present in
all years.
Data on workers are extensively described in Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008).
We cleaned the data by eliminating the records with missing entries on either the firm
or the worker identifier, those corresponding to workers younger than 25 (just 171 ob-
servations, 008% of the total), and those who had worked less than 4 weeks in a year.
We also avoided duplication of workers within the same year; when a worker changed
employer, we considered only the job at which he had worked the longest.
The main econometric problem in recovering TFP is that inputs are a choice vari-
able and thus are likely to be correlated with unobservables, particularly the produc-
tivity shock. This is the classical problem of endogeneity in the estimation of produc-
tion functions. To deal with it, we follow the procedure proposed by Olley and Pakes
(1996). Using a standard dynamic programming approach, Olley and Pakes showed that
the unobservable productivity shock can be approximated by a nonparametric function
of the investment and the capital stock. To allow for sectoral heterogeneity in the pro-
duction function, we estimate it separately at the sectoral level. The estimation proce-
dure, the coefficients, and all the results are described in detail in Cingano and Schivardi
(2004).
To make sure that our results are not dependent on the TFP measure, we also per-
form some direct production function estimation exercises. To control for endogeneity,
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Table 9. Coefficients of the additional controls in Tables 3, 4, and 10.
Dependent Variable
TFP TFP logVA logVA ROA ROA
Firm age −003∗∗∗ −005∗∗∗ −002∗∗ −003∗ −016 −033
(0009) (0018) (0009) (0017) (0222) (0337)
Firm age · family 004∗∗ 003 076∗
(0023) (0021) (0448)
Firm age · foreign 003 000 −045
(0031) (0028) (0750)
Firm age · government 002 −003 −012
(0034) (0028) (0518)
Work age −048∗∗∗ −071∗∗∗ −043∗∗∗ −065∗∗∗ −1733∗∗∗ −1737∗∗∗
(0076) (0138) (0072) (0133) (1655) (2789)
Work age · family 023 016 −029
(0172) (0160) (3411)
Work age · foreign 051∗∗ 064∗∗∗ 112
(0241) (0242) (6067)
Work age · government −025 −043 −578
(0526) (0501) (8890)
Share exec 161∗∗∗ 148 220∗∗∗ 241∗∗ −627 −2465
(0507) (1027) (0470) (0952) (11678) (19825)
Share exec · family −050 −072 2148
(1208) (1109) (25353)
Share exec · foreign 082 007 580
(1555) (1454) (33950)
Share exec · government 1005∗∗∗ 790∗∗∗ 19357∗∗∗
(2915) (2660) (63083)
Share white-collar 066∗∗∗ 079∗∗∗ 063∗∗∗ 071∗∗∗ 180 051
(0054) (0099) (0048) (0096) (1348) (1797)
Share white-collar · family −016 −010 231
(0114) (0106) (2357)
Share white-collar · foreign −019 −012 250
(0145) (0129) (3494)
Share white-collar · government −025 −011 −357
(0167) (0160) (3476)
No. workers 002∗∗ 001 074∗∗∗ 072∗∗∗ 017 037
(0009) (0015) (0013) (0018) (0215) (0301)
No. workers · family −002 001 −029
(0020) (0020) (0431)
No. workers · foreign 004 004 009
(0025) (0024) (0600)
No. workers · government −002 −005 −129∗
(0036) (0033) (0730)
(Continues)
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Table 9. Continued.
Dependent Variable
TFP TFP logVA logVA ROA ROA
Share male 007∗∗ 005 017∗∗∗ 015∗∗ −097 −134
(0038) (0061) (0038) (0058) (0906) (1417)
Share male · family −001 003 138
(0065) (0061) (1498)
Share male · foreign 005 −008 −227
(0110) (0099) (2731)
Share male · government 051∗∗∗ 043∗∗∗ −015
(0184) (0150) (3160)
Note: The table reports the coefficients on the additional controls in the last two columns of Tables 3, 4 and 10. See the
main text for the definition of the variables. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels for the null hypothesis of
a zero coefficient are labelled as follows: ∗ is 10%, ∗∗ is 5%, ∗∗∗ is 1%.
Table 10. Value added and share of senior executives by control type.
Dependent Variable: logValue Added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
φ 0131∗∗∗ 0127∗∗∗ 0056∗ 0102∗∗ 0109∗∗∗ 0129∗∗∗ 0135∗∗∗
(0039) (0039) (0032) (0043) (0039) (0042) (0042)
φ · foreign −0088 −0060 −0030 0003 −0072 −0010 −0048
(0061) (0060) (0046) (0066) (0061) (0063) (0065)
φ · family −0204∗∗∗ −0186∗∗∗ −0115∗∗∗ −0179∗∗∗ −0137∗∗∗ −0124∗∗∗ −0135∗∗∗
(0046) (0045) (0038) (0050) (0046) (0047) (0048)
φ · government −0471∗∗∗ −0442∗∗∗ −0304∗∗∗ −0370∗∗∗ −0347∗∗∗ −0309∗∗∗ −0246∗∗
(0084) (0081) (0072) (0098) (0085) (0091) (0107)
Note: The variable φ is the share of senior executives who have been with the firm at least 5 years in columns (1)–(3), at
least 7 years in column (4), and at least 3 years in column (5). All regressions are weighted with sampling weights with the
exception of column (3), which is unweighted. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), regressions in columns (2)–(5) include a third
degree polynomial in capital and investment to control for the unobserved productivity shock. All regressions include control
type dummies, year dummies, and two-digit sector dummies. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance
levels for the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient are labelled by asterisks: ∗ is 10%, ∗∗ is 5%, and ∗∗∗ is 1%.
we again follow Olley and Pakes, and include in the regression a third degreeg polyno-
mial series in i and k and their interactions, which approximate the unobserved produc-
tivity shock.19 In Table 10, we report a series of exercises analogous to those of Table 3
in the main text. The dependent variable is log value added, the regressors are capital
and labor in addition to the share of senior executives interacted with the control dum-
mies, and the control dummies themselves. All the regressions include year and sectoral
dummies. As in Table 3, we use sample weights with the exception of column (3). In col-
19Note that when the nonparametric term in capital and investment is included, the capital coefficient
can no longer be interpreted as the parameter of the production function in the first stage of the procedure.
However, given that the coefficient on capital is of no particular interest to us, this is inconsequential for
our purposes.
452 Lippi and Schivardi Quantitative Economics 5 (2014)
umn (1), we do simple OLS; the Olley and Pakes controls are introduced in column (2)
and maintained throughout; in column (3), we do not weight observations; column (4)
uses a 7-year period to become senior and column (5) uses a 3-year period; column (6)
introduces the additional controls, interacted with ownership dummies in column (7).
Results are similar across specifications; more importantly, they are very much in line
with those of Table 3.
Appendix E: Derivation of the likelihood function
The likelihood for a sample of observations Y under the parametrization Θ is
L(Θ;Y) =
K∏
κ=1
3∏
j=1
nκ∏
i=1
1
(2πσ2j )
1/2
exp
(
−1
2
[
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j
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
where K is the number of “groups” in the model (four control types in our case). This
gives
logL(Θ;Y)= −1
2
K∑
κ=1
3∑
j=1
nκ log
(
2πσ2j
)− 1
2
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κ=1
3∑
j=1
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For all observables j and for each group κ (hence omitting the j, κ subindices),
nκ∑
i=1
[
yi − f
σ
]2
= nκ + nκ
σ2
(f − y¯κ)2 where y¯κ ≡ 1
nκ
nκ∑
i=1
yi
Replacing this expression in equation (21), we can rewrite the likelihood function by
minimizing the distance between the theoretical value f (Θk) and the sample average
y¯
j
κ for each variable j, or
logL(Θ;Y) = −1
2
K∑
κ=1
3∑
j=1
nκ ln
(
2πσ2j
)
(22)
− 1
2
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
The measurement error for variable j (common for all group κ) is σ2j ≡ var(yj) =∑nκ
i=1
1
nκ
(y
j
iκ − y¯jκ)2.
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E.1 Score and information matrix
Let M be the size of Θ. The nth element of the score is given by
sn(Θ;Y) ≡ ∂ logL(Θ;Y)
∂θn
= −1
2
∂F(Θ;Y)
∂θn
=
K∑
κ=1
3∑
j=1
(
nκ
σ2j
)(
y¯
j
κ − f j(Θκ)
)∂f j(Θκ)
∂θn

The (nm)th element of the M ×M information matrix I(Θ) is defined as
Inm(Θ)= E
[
∂ logL(Θ;Y)
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∂ logL(Θ;Y)
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]
= E[sn(ΘY)sm(ΘY)]
which in our case becomes
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